Some reports suggest that there may be as many as four battleships in the British squadron, and
Supermarina, inspired by the defensive-offensive principle, aimed above all at the conservation of the fleet, does not
he believes that the situation is sufficiently favorable to recommend a naval clash, relying on
especially to the effectiveness of the air force's intervention. On the morning of the 9th, he sent a coded telegram to the admiral
Samples with the following orders:

Your action today should be inspired by the following concepts (alt) First, do not – I repeat – do not move away from the
Our air and naval bases aim to allow preventive or simultaneous air actions against the enemy (halt)
Secondly, possibly engage against armored groups when they are still separated according to note
forecast (alt) Third delay ballistic contact purpose allow disable enemy forces for
aerial bombardment (alt) Fourth at sunset direct with larger ships towards bases without normal constraints
dislocations (alt) Fifth if conditions are favorable use night time torpedo vessel (alt) 123009.

At 7.30 on the 9th, Admiral Cunningham is informed by the reconnaissance taken off from the aircraft carrier
Eagle of the position of the Italian squadron, about 50 miles east of Capo Spartivento in Calabria, and then directs
at 20 knots north, to position itself between the Italian fleet and the Taranto base.

During the morning, 13 Italian destroyers were sent to bases to refuel.
The Italian air reconnaissance, based on previous assessments, is instead sent eastwards towards the Channel
from Sicily, towards Libya and, from the bases in Puglia, towards Greece, but he cannot find any trace of the
Mediterranean Fleet throughout the morning, creating considerable apprehension in the commands. As the
It is now clear that the fleet cannot be in the area where it was expected to go. It is assumed
then the objective of his action could be an attack on the bases in Puglia, and the reconnaissance is
also started in other sectors.

At 1310, nine Swordfish torpedo bombers of the 813th and 824th Squadrons, taking off from the EAGLE, attacked the
cruisers of the Italian II Squadron, launching first from low altitude and from about 1.000 meters against the
TRENTO and BOLZANO, which react with heavy anti-aircraft fire and avoid torpedoes by maneuvering, and then
against the POLA and the ZARA, from about 1.000 meters, from an altitude of 15 meters. The POLA, turning sharply to
left and putting it at full speed, manages to narrowly avoid the torpedo, which passes a few meters away from the
stern, while the ZARA avoids being hit by turning sharply to starboard. The action of the torpedo bombers
impressed the Italians with the maneuverability of the aircraft and the courage of the pilots. Contrary to what
appreciated by Admiral Paladini, who in his report will state that three planes had been shot down by the
fire, all nine Swordfish manage to return to the EAGLE.
The air attack made Campioni understand that the Mediterranean Fleet must be nearby.
reconnaissance aircraft of the 142nd Maritime Reconnaissance Squadron, finally locates the British squadron at
13:30, 80 miles northeast of the Italian fleet.

The DIAZ and the CADORNA are forced to return to base due to breakdowns.
As soon as he received the communication, Campioni gave the order to the fleet to set the bow at 30°, heading towards
enemy, and catapults three of the scouts aboard the cruisers to the bow of the fleet.
Meanwhile Cunningham proceeds northwest to cut the road to Taranto, periodically
informed of the movements of the Italian fleet by the reconnaissance aircraft launched from the EAGLE.
From 2.00 pm onwards the two fleets approached with converging routes, in slightly rough seas, with skies
Clear skies and visibility of about 25 kilometers. They are actually facing each other:
Italian forces: 2 battleships with 320 mm guns; 6 heavy cruisers with 203 mm guns; 8
light cruisers; 16 destroyers.
British Forces: 3 battleships with 381-inch guns; 1 aircraft carrier; 5 light cruisers; 14
destroyer.

Between 14:50 and 15:10 PM, the ships began to be sighted. Cunningham had moved the fleet away by about ten
miles to the east the cruiser GLOUCESTER, damaged, the aircraft carrier EAGLE and 2 destroyers,
to prevent them from getting involved in the clash.

As soon as the enemy was sighted, the DUCA DEGLI ABRUZZI and the GARIBALDI turned 70°, bringing the
speed to 30 knots and at 15:20 they opened fire on the British cruisers with 152mm guns from a
distance of 20.000 meters. The cruiser ORION, more or less simultaneously, opens fire on the
Italian destroyers of the IX Squadron, having reached 16.000 meters, turned outwards. At 15:26 the DI
GIUSSANO and DA BARBIANO join the firefight. The firefight between the cruisers, well directed by
both sides, continues until 15:31, but the only result is the damage to the aircraft and the
catapulted by shrapnel. The aircraft had to be jettisoned because it was leaking fuel.
The battleships intervene: CESARE and POLA approach the enemy, while WARSPITE and
MALAYA opened fire on the 24.000 meter cruisers with eight well-placed salvos which forced
the Italian cruisers maneuvered to avoid the attack. The two forces then set course north.
At 15:48 WARSPITE catapulted the second aircraft for fire observation.
At 15:53 ​​CESARE opened fire on WARSPITE from 26.400 meters, and Campioni ordered the cruisers
heavy to close the distances towards the enemy to get within range of the 203mm guns.
CAVOUR also opens fire on ROYAL SOVEREIGN from 30.000 meters.
The distance then reduced to 22.000 meters, and the British opened fire in turn. At 15:59 two shells from
320 of the CESARE fall very close to the WARSPITE, while a moment later the CESARE is hit by
a 381-inch shell, level with the aft funnel, on the starboard side, killing 66 men and wounding 49.
The projectile hits the magazine of 120 mm shells, the explosion of which causes fires in the casemate and in the
NCO quarters, while gas and smoke invade the rooms of four boilers that must be turned off and
evacuated, reducing speed to 18 knots.

Meanwhile all the Italian heavy cruisers open fire on battleships and cruisers, which in turn
they react; the BOLZANO is hit by three shells fired from the ORION.
At 16:05, CESARE ordered the break of contact by turning west and continuing to fire with the
aft towers.

The Italian destroyer squadrons launch an attack to cover the retreat: the IX squadron
Having reached 13.500 metres, she launched 5 torpedoes against the leading cruisers of the British formation, two of which
are seen crossing the formation of British destroyers, and then falling back to the west-north-west,
responding to enemy fire. The ALFIERI was grazed, but sustained no damage.
The VII squadron, after having laid a curtain of fog to cover the retreating ships, launches itself against the
enemy firing with 120mm guns, and reaching 8.500 meters at 16:18 launches torpedoes, moving away
then under British fire. The commander of the SAETTA has the impression of having hit a torpedo,
but in reality no one hits the mark.

The XI squadron spreads a curtain of fog to hide both the retreating ships and the others
destroyer, and launches into the attack under enemy fire launching 10 torpedoes from 11.000 meters, for
then move away under fire. During the move away the ENGINEER is attacked by a torpedo bomber which
approaches at 50 meters altitude, and repels the attack by firing with the machine guns and mistakenly estimating that
having shot him down.

The XII squadron also launches an attack, but its action is disturbed by the fog of the curtains
smoke bombs laid by the XI squadron preceding it. On the approach, under fire from the cruisers
British, a destroyer is attacked by an aircraft. The CORAZZIERE launches three torpedoes and the ASCARI one,
from a distance of 14.000 meters. The squadron then reverses course, under enemy fire, and the LANCIERE
launches three retreating torpedoes that passed astern of the NUBIAN.

The XIV squadron, arrived from Taranto, launched the attack at 16:09, but gave up at 16:28 having
the impression that the enemy had moved outwards and was still at a distance of 18.000
meters. Given the great distance at which the torpedoes were launched, they did not pose a great danger to the
English.

Meanwhile, nine Swordfish were launched from the EAGLE to attack the Italian ships with torpedoes.
Having flown over the WARSPITE which was under fire from the Italian ships, they headed towards the cruisers,
met with intense anti-aircraft fire, but still carrying out the attack in patrols of three aircraft in
rapid succession. The pilots, confused by the smoke from the artillery, have the mistaken impression of having put
I've hit at least one torpedo. The Italians believe they shot down at least two planes, but this too
This impression is incorrect, as all nine aircraft landed on the EAGLE at 17:05.

Some radio intercepts lead Cunningham to believe that the Italian force is retreating, but he does not
he considers it appropriate to launch himself into the cloud of fog in pursuit (he did not yet have radar), and directs
to the north-northwest, sending destroyers ahead. These, once the fog had passed,
17:00 PM, they find the sea clear. The Mediterranean Fleet remains cruising west for an hour,
reaching up to 25 miles from the Calabrian coast, and at 18:30 begins heading for Malta.

The air force, whose intervention Campioni had requested since 2pm, due to the cumbersome procedure
foreseen for communications, which involved the transmission of the request to Supermarina, from there to
Superplane, which finally sent the executive orders to the Teams, reaches the skies of the Naval Forces starting
from 4.40 pm, once the battle was over, failing to provide any assistance during the clash between the two fleets.
In the afternoon-evening, the aircraft took off from the bases in Sicily and Puglia, a total of 126 planes,
They carried out a total of 17 attacks, dropping over 500 bombs from altitudes of around 3.000 metres.
WARSPITE was bombed at 16:41, 17:15, 17:35, 18:23 and 19:11; EAGLE at 17:45, 18:09, 18:26, 18:42
and 19:00, and many attacks are conducted against cruisers and destroyers, with good accuracy but
poor results.

Unfortunately, at least as many attacks are carried out by mistake by Italian aircraft on Italian naval squadrons.
between 16:20 PM and 19:30 PM, and one aircraft was shot down by Italian anti-aircraft fire. It should be considered that,
However unfortunate and sometimes unjustifiable, incidents of this sort will occur on all fronts and for all
belligerents during the war.(3)

The Italian ships retreat towards the bases in Sicily, at Messina, Augusta, Palermo, and Naples. On the day
Subsequently, a torpedo bomber attack on Augusta caused the sinking of the destroyer Pancaldo. 4
The analysis of the poor effectiveness of the attacks and the errors committed by the Air Force, led the general
Santoro, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Royal Air Force, summarized the causes in these terms: 5
“The Italian Air Force could be considered quantitatively sufficient to make its weight felt also in maritime operations, in conjunction with the Navy or not, and had a network of air bases excellently located to conduct these operations; but it was at a disadvantage for such an action, essentially for three reasons: – because it lacked, for the moment, torpedo bombers; – because the dropped ammunition, more or less suitable against land targets, was unsuitable against armored vessels; – because in peacetime the Air Force and Navy had not sufficiently cared for and prepared for the future collaboration in war of their respective means, especially in complex actions. In the evening of that same day, Force H reached the vicinity of Sardinia and within range of the Air Force. It was repeatedly attacked by about thirty bombers, two of which were shot down, which in total dropped 144 250 kg bombs, hitting the Hood, the Ark Royal and two destroyers. Force H was Forced to retreat to the Balearics, where she remained until the 10th, then headed for Gibraltar. During the return voyage, the destroyer Escort was torpedoed and sunk by the submarine GUGLIELMO MARCONI, 80 miles east of Gibraltar.